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Some Consequences of Globalization 
for Developing Countries 
Abstract 
Globalization improves the prospects for developing countries (DCs) to catch up 
economically with industrialized countries. Depending on economic policies with 
respect to openness and factor accumulation, globalization may increase capital and 
technology flows to DCs, thereby generating a higher rate of income growth than 
would be possible in a less integrated world economy. Nevertheless, many observers 
draw an overly pessimistic picture of the perspectives of DCs in the era of 
globalization, mainly for three reasons. First, DC membership in institutionalized 
regional integration schemes such as in Europe and North America is sometimes 
considered to be a necessary precondition for economic success. Second, a low level 
of interfirm technology cooperation between rich and poor countries is feared to 
delink DCs from technological progress. Third, a relatively high concentration of 
foreign direct investment flows on a few advanced DC hosts is said to limit the 
development prospects for the majority of DCs. The paper shows that such concerns 
are largely unfounded. 
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I. Introduction 
Globalization means a closer international integration of production and markets. The 
increasing interdependence of economies around the world is the result of growing 
trade and capital flows and rising interfirm technology cooperation. These trends 
reflect the liberalization of trade initiated by successive GATT rounds and, especially 
in the 1980s, the worldwide deregulation of financial markets and other business 
services such as banking and insurance. All this has led to more competition in the 
world economy, and to new profit opportunities for international investors. Developing 
countries (DCs) have to adjust to the changing international environment, if they want 
to participate in the ongoing globalization of production and markets. 
Globalization is by no means an entirely new phenomenon. What has changed in the 
world economy during the last decade or so is that, thanks to the micro-electronics 
revolution, new communication technologies have evolved that allow for the 
international diffusion of new production and organization technologies at low cost. 
Transportation costs per unit of production are declining, since new technologies lead 
to economies of scale in transportation and tend to reduce the volume of international 
transport in raw materials necessary to produce one unit of final output. 
The relatively new aspect that makes globalization different from previous advances in 
the international division of labor is the ability of producers to slice up the value chain 
(Krugman 1985), i.e., the possibility to achieve a geographically dispersed 
fragmentation of production. If firms place their production around the world, sourcing 
this component from one country and that component from another, it may still be easy 
to say where certain products have been assembled, but it will become increasingly 
difficult to say where they actually have been made. Therefore, complementary to 
slicing up the value chain, another new aspect of globalization is the emergence of 
large exports of manufactured goods from low-wage DCs to high-wage industrialized   2
countries, and the accompanying increase of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to 
DCs. 
The hypothesis raised in this paper is that globalization improves the prospects for 
DCs to catch up economically with industrialized countries. By contrast, many 
observers draw an overly pessimistic picture of the perspectives of DCs in the era of 
globalization, mainly for three reasons. First, DC membership in, or association with 
institutionalized regional integration schemes such as in Europe and North America is 
sometimes considered to be a necessary precondition for economic success. Second, a 
low level of interfirm technology cooperation between rich and poor countries is 
feared to delink DCs from technological progress. Third, a relatively high 
concentration of FDI flows on a few advanced DC hosts is said to limit the 
development prospects for the majority of DCs.  
Such concerns are largely unfounded. It mainly depends on domestic economic 
policies whether DCs can successfully grasp the chances for catching up involved in 
globalization. Controlling for differences among DCs in the rates of physical and 
human capital accumulation, we find that open DCs may realize substantial GDP gains 
within a shorter period of time than closed economies. Depending on DC economic 
policies with respect to openness and factor accumulation, globalization tends to 
increase capital and technology flows to DCs that can generate a higher rate of income 
growth than would be possible in a less integrated world economy. This is why 
globalization should be seen as an opportunity for DCs rather than a threat, 
notwithstanding the implied restrictions for DC economic policies. 
II.  Developing Countries in the Global Economy: Major Issues 
Stylized Facts 
Globalization shapes the world economy in different ways. Most obviously, 
international trade and capital flows are affected. Over the last 30 years or so,   3
international trade has grown faster on average than production (GATT, var. iss.; see 
also Table 1). This implies a more integrated world economy. Closer integration brings 
about opportunities for specialization, and hence increases interdependencies. This is 
highlighted by recent changes in the structure of world trade. 
First, world trade in manufactures has grown faster than total world trade (Table 1), 
which supports the notion that slicing up the value chain has become a new 
opportunity in the era of globalization. International sourcing, i.e., the purchase of 
intermediate inputs from foreign sources, has grown faster than domestic sourcing and 
now accounts for about half of all imports by major countries (OECD 1994). Second, 
intra-industry trade has risen significantly in almost all OECD countries, which share 
fairly similar factor endowments. However, it has also increased between Japan and its 
Asian neighbors even in physical and human capital intensive products, despite fairly 
different factor endowments (Nunnenkamp et al. 1994). Hence, the pattern of world 
trade changes, slowly but steadily, in favor of trade in manufactures. Trade in 
manufactures seems to be less dependent on overall relative factor endowments, but 
more on relative endowments with immobile factors of production. This is a 
consequence of the increased international mobility of capital, as indicated by the 
recent surge in FDI flows. 
In contrast to relatively steady changes in the pattern of international trade, a dramatic 
increase in FDI flows has taken place during the last decade. FDI flows have grown 
even twice as fast as international trade since 1983 (Table 1). In addition to rising FDI 
flows, other forms of international investment cooperation such as licensing, joint 
ventures, offshore processing, minority participations, and so-called strategic alliances 
have become more important in recent years. As a rough approximation, the number of 
international interfirm cooperation agreements has doubled over the 1980s (OECD 
1994). 
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Table 1 — Stylized Facts of Globalization 
 World 
productiona 
World trade  World FDId Note: 
   Totalb Manu-
facturesc 




1983  100 100 100 100  13.1  24.2 
1984  103.8 105.8 102.8 116.1  12.7  20.8 
1985  107.5 106.2 102.8 119.0  12.0  23.6 
1986  111.3 117.4 125.7 192.5  13.1  14.7 
1987  113.8 137.8 153.3 298.0  14.7  11.6 
1988  118.8 157.0 176.6 367.4  15.6  15.7 
1989  122.5 170.3 188.5 470.6  18.2  14.7 
1990  125.0 192.3 216.4 493.0  17.9  14.8 
1991  123.8 197.5 223.5 392.9  19.6  26.5 
1992  125.0 213.1 244.4 396.9  20.8  30.1 
1993  127.5 212.5 246.7 460.7  23.8  36.0 
1994 131.3  237.7  .. 468.1  ..  39.3 
aReal GDP index, 1983 = 100. — bAverage of world merchandise exports and imports plus world 
exports and imports of commercial services; 1983 = 100. — cWorld exports of manufactures 
(SITC 5+6+7+8-67-68); 1983 = 100. — dAverage of direct investment abroad and in the reporting 
economy; 1983 = 100. — eDeveloping countries' share in world exports of manufactures 
(percent). — fDeveloping countries' share in world inflows of foreign direct investment, excluding 
developing countries for which oil production is the dominant industry (percent). 
Sources:  GATT, International Trade, Trends and Statistics; IMF, Balance of Payments 
Statistics; UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
 
All three aspects of globalization – international trade, FDI, and international interfirm 
cooperation – are dominated by OECD countries so far. But the dynamic East and 
Southeast Asian economies are rapidly becoming involved, as are some countries in 
Latin America and in Central and Eastern Europe. Taken as a group, DCs strongly 
increased their share in world exports of manufactures between 1983 and 1993 (Table 
1). Likewise, their share in recorded world FDI inflows rose steeply, especially since   5
the mid 1980s.
1 While these simple statistics confirm that the ongoing globalization of 
production and markets is not only an issue concerning developed countries, it may be 
open to question whether the closer integration of the world economy is due to 
regionalization rather than globalization, whether technology flows to DCs are 
severely limited, and whether FDI flows to DCs are concentrated on just a few fairly 
advanced hosts. We briefly discuss each of these issues in the following. 
Globalization vs. Regionalization 
Some authors claim that there is no general trend towards globalization involving DCs. 
They argue that a strong move towards regional production and sourcing networks will 
impair the chances of DCs to benefit from technology transfers and to make full use of 
their comparative cost advantages (Oman 1994). This would imply that DCs face the 
risk of being delinked from the growth dynamics of globalization, if they were 
excluded from major regional groupings, notably NAFTA and the EU. 
This idea deserves second thoughts. It is definitely true that not all DCs have 
participated in globalization so far.
2 At present, economic dynamism is regionally 
concentrated, namely in Asia. In Asia, intra-regional trade flows have grown faster 
than extra-regional trade flows: The share of intra-Asian exports of manufactures has 
increased from 22 percent of total Asian exports in 1980 to 36 percent in 1993 (UN 
1994). But these observations alone do not support the claim that regionalization, 
rather than globalization, is the rule of the game in the world economy. 
                                                 
1  We are not aware of any systematic statistical information on the change of the share of DCs in 
international interfirm cooperation agreements. However, casual evidence suggests that FDI and 
non-equity interfirm cooperation agreements (NEC) are complements rather than substitutes 
(Gundlach, Nunnenkamp 1996), which is why FDI figures can confidently be assumed to reflect 
NEC developments as well. For a detailed assessment of the relation between FDI and NEC, see 
also Nunnenkamp et al. (1994). 
2  For a detailed assessment of the present state of globalization for various regional groups of DCs, 
see Nunnenkamp, Gundlach (1995).   6
Regional linkages, whether institutionalized or not, are just one among many other 
factors that may determine whether a country will participate successfully in 
globalization. Depending on the motivations of international investors, factors such as 
macroeconomic stability, a high rate of factor accumulation, a relatively undistorted 
trade regime and openness for international capital flows may be more important than 
any gains that could result from privileged access to a large market. Privileged market 
access per se is unlikely to advance the international competitiveness of new suppliers. 
That is, close ties with major regional integration schemes seem to be neither 
necessary nor sufficient for joining the globalization club. 
To assess the empirical relevance of this hypothesis, we first compare EU import 
shares of manufactures for different groups of DCs. The EU is a large and relatively 
open market for manufactures, notwithstanding differential treatment of its external 
trading partners. For example, DCs from the African, Caribbean and Pacific region 
(ACP) rank well ahead of other DCs in the pyramid of EU trade preferences (Hiemenz 
et al. 1994). Therefore, one should expect that ACP countries display a better 
performance on EU markets than other DCs, if institutionalized linkages to regional 
integration schemes actually dominated the presumed trend towards globalization. 
Table 2 shows that this is not the case: 
−  ACP countries did not emerge as new suppliers on EU markets, despite their 
favorable market access. The share of EU imports of manufactures from ACP 
countries actually decreased. As it seems, this fall was mainly caused by a drastic 
reduction of EU imports of physical capital intensive chemicals from ACP 
countries, whereas the EU import shares of ACP countries in human capital 
intensive machinery and labor intensive textiles and clothing largely remained 
constant at a low level. 
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Table  2  —  The Regional Structure of Extra-EU Imports of Manufactures, 1980 and 1993 
(percent) 
   Total  Machinery,  trans-
port equipment 
Chemicals Clothing  and 
textiles 
Extra-EU  1980  37.2 35.8 28.8 45.0 
importsa  1993  40.8 40.1 29.5 36.3 
thereof:b        
DCs 1980  16.5  7.7  10.5  45.2 
  1993  22.1 19.3 11.3 41.8 
thereof:c        
ACP  1980  5.8 3.1  39.3 2.0 
  1993  4.1 3.3 7.7 2.5 
Asian NIEsd  1980  47.9 59.1  4.5 46.3 
 1993  41.5 56.8 21.3 14.3 
ASEANe  1980  6.7 8.8 2.0 6.4 
 1993  18.8 18.7  5.3 18.1 
China  1980  5.6 0.5  14.7 6.8 
 1993  24.7 12.6 21.6 19.2 
South Asiaf 1980  10.2  1.5  2.4  15.6 
 1993  10.9  1.4  8.2 40.0 
Latin America  1980  11.4  14.3  22.9  7.6 
  1993  8.4 8.7  21.9 5.8 
aIn percent of total EU imports. — bIn percent of extra-EU imports; DCs defined as Class 2 according to 
EU classification. — cIn percent of EU imports from DCs. — dHong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan. — eExcluding Singapore and Brunei. —fBangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. 
Source:  EUROSTAT (var. iss.). 
 
−  Asian DCs, especially China and ASEAN member countries, increased their EU 
import shares of manufactures considerably, despite missing trade privileges and 
geographical distance. Asian NIEs, which have almost achieved the status of 
industrialized countries, did not gain overall trade shares, but instead shifted their 
supply from labor intensive textiles and clothing to physical capital intensive 
chemicals. South Asia, which is more comparable to ACP countries in terms of per 
capita income, did not achieve much progress in overall trade shares. Nevertheless,   8
South Asia reports a strong increase in textiles and clothing, which obviously 
reflects its comparative advantage. 
−  Latin America records a relatively strong decline in EU import shares of human 
capital intensive machinery and transport equipment, but otherwise fairly stable EU 
import shares. 
Recent changes in EU import shares of manufactures from different DC groups seem 
to be unrelated to trade preferences granted by the EU. To say the least, privileged DC 
groups did not gain market shares, and non-favored DCs did not suffer losses. 
Institutionalized ties with regional integration schemes such as the EU seem to matter 
less than DC economic policies when it comes to explaining success and failure in 
globalization.  
Second, we refer to the distribution of worldwide FDI flows, in order to tentatively 
assess whether regionalization has dominated over globalization. If so, the formation 
of regional blocs should have resulted in FDI diversion away from non-member DCs. 
The deepening of EU integration in the aftermath of the internal market program of 
1985 may provide a case in point. The EU indeed attracted substantially higher FDI 
inflows in 1989-1991 (US$ 89.3 billion on an annual average) than in 1983-1988 (US$ 
27.4 billion) (UNCTAD 1995c). As a result, the EU's share in worldwide FDI flows 
increased from 30 to 47 percent. EU integration caused higher intra-EU FDI as 
European companies became more eurocentric, and EU integration also induced higher 
FDI inflows from Japan and the United States.
3 However, this boom did not result in a 
proportional effect on EU FDI outflows to various regions, it mainly affected EU FDI 
outflows to the United States. EU investors neglected DCs only temporarily and 
largely because of home-made economic disturbances in Latin America. Likewise, 
European integration has not led US and Japanese investors to curtail their FDI in 
                                                 
3   For a more detailed analysis, see Agarwal et al. (1995).   9
DCs. Hence, the boom of FDI flows to the EU during the process of completing the 
internal market does not appear to have resulted in significant FDI diversion at the 
expense of DCs. Moreover, it was a rather short-term phenomenon. In 1992-1994, the 
EU's share in worldwide FDI flows went down to 37.6 percent. At the same time, all 
DCs taken together nearly doubled their share from 18.8 percent in 1989-1991 to 34.9 
percent in 1992-1994 (UNCTAD 1995c). All this suggests that the recent revival of 
regional integration must not be interpreted as the dominant feature of the international 
division of labor. 
Technology Flows to DCs 
Another concern that DCs may be delinked from global trends is related to the 
marginal role of DCs in the generation of technological knowledge. As a matter of 
fact, strategic technology alliances are largely confined to OECD-based enterprises 
(Table 3). Especially joint R&D activities are almost exclusively pursued within the  
 
Table 3 — Distribution of Strategic Technology Alliances, 1980–1989 
    Share of (percent): 




Total 4192  95.7  2.3  1.5 
thereof:        
Joint R&D  1752  99.1  0.5  0.4 
R&D contracts, etc.  532  96.6  2.6  0.2 
Joint ventures  1224  90.9  4.9  3.4 
Source:  Freeman, Hagedoorn (1994). 
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Triad of the EU, Japan and the US. The dominance of the Triad is somewhat weaker 
with respect to joint ventures not exclusively devoted to R&D  activities, but the 
participation of DC companies is below 10 percent even in this category.  
In contrast to a widespread belief, this observation does not imply that DCs are 
excluded from technological progress. Not surprisingly, technology motivated 
interfirm cooperation is largely a business between equally advanced partners 
operating at the forefront of technological progress. With few exceptions, DC 
companies do not provide the required match of partners in this field of interfirm 
cooperation. Factor endowments typically prevailing in DCs prevent a stronger role in 
the  generation of technological innovations. Put differently, strategic technology 
alliances are an inappropriate means to integrate DCs into corporate globalization 
strategies. Nevertheless, DCs can derive benefits from transfers of technology. It is the 
application of internationally available technologies which matters most for DCs. 
Other instruments than strategic alliances, notably international trade in capital goods 
and FDI, are better suited for transferring technology to DCs. 
The empirical evidence on trade and FDI supports the proposition of an enhanced 
integration of DCs into globalization strategies. Closer trade and investment linkages 
are observed for all DCs taken together: Their share in worldwide trade and FDI 
increased (see Table 1). Moreover, Table 4 shows that exports have grown faster than 
overall production in DCs (proxied by their GNP), and the growth of FDI flows to 
DCs still exceeded export growth.
4 
However, the average development for all DCs obscures remarkable differences 
between various country groups. Both indicators presented in Table 4 reveal that it is 
mainly East Asia which has become more integrated into the international division of 
                                                 
4   The temporary decline of the export-to-GNP ratio in the early 1980s is due to the drastic fall in 
oil prices after their 1980-peak. In 1987, nominal exports of oil exporting countries were less 
than half the 1980-value.   11
labor.
5 By contrast, the export-to-GNP ratio of Sub-Saharan Africa did not change 
significantly since the mid 1980s, and FDI inflows remained at a low level in this 
region (as well as in South Asia). Obviously, Sub-Saharan Africa in particular has not 
benefited from the trend towards globalized production and marketing. Nevertheless, 
Table 4 contradicts the notion that only few DCs, notably Asian NIEs, are participating 
in globalization. The FDI-to-export ratio suggests that Latin America has restored its 
locational attractiveness after several countries in this region had implemented far-
reaching economic reforms. At the same time, transition economies in Eastern Europe 
have emerged as new competitors for FDI. 
 
Table 4 — The Integration of Selected DC Regions into the World Economy, 1980-1995 
  Exports in percent of GNP  FDI inflows (net) in percent of exports
  1980 1987 1990 1992 1995
a 
1980 1987 1990 1992 1995
a 
All  DCs  30.3 20.5 20.6 21.4 25.1 0.7  2.1  2.7  4.7  6.6 
East  Asia  and  Pacific  23.2 26.5 28.1 29.9 34.8 1.3  2.7  4.3  6.5  9.5 
South  Asia  10.8  9.9 10.7  12.6  15.8  0.8 1.3 1.1 1.4 3.0 
L a t i n   A m e r i c a   a n d              
Caribbean  18.1 17.5 16.2 15.5 15.6 4.8  4.6  4.6  7.9  7.5 
M i d d l e   E a s t   a n d             
North  Africa  50.7 25.4 34.9 31.6 29.4 -1.5 1.0  1.7  1.4  1.3 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  33.6 29.7 31.4 29.6 27.5 0.0  2.2  1.0  1.8  2.6 
E a s t   E u r o p e   a n d             
Central Asia  –b – b  13.9 17.2 13.7c  0.0 0.0 0.2 3.1 7.4c 
aPreliminary. — bNot reported because of unreliable GNP data. — c1994. 
Source:   World Bank (var. iss.). 
                                                 
5  The comparison of the export-to-GNP ratio across country groups is not meaningful because this 
ratio tends to be systematically lower for large economies. Hence, the interpretation of this 
indicator is restricted to its development over time.    12
Some observers fear that new manufacturing techniques will render it more difficult 
for DCs to attract foreign capital in the future, which would increase the risk of DCs 
falling further behind technologically advanced economies (Freeman, Hagedoorn 
1994). By contrast, we maintain that the attractiveness of DCs for foreign capital is not 
determined by their role in producing new technologies. Rather, their attractiveness 
depends on their capabilities in applying existing technologies. In this respect, many 
DCs made substantial progress recently, not least supported by FDI and imports of 
capital goods. 
Another question is whether DCs receive technologies that fit their factor endowments. 
What can be expected in a globalizing economy is that NIEs should receive a higher 
share of sophisticated technologies than less advanced DCs (LDCs). Table 5 provides 
some empirical evidence derived from the MERIT data base (Freeman, Hagedoorn 
1994) with regard to the relative importance of so-called core technologies in 
international interfirm technology partnering. It is widely accepted that information 
technology, biotechnology, and new materials constitute the heart of many future 
technological developments affecting manufacturing, but also many services. 
Technology partnering among industrialized countries, and especially within the Triad, 
is dominated by these three core technologies. The share of core technologies in Triad-
DC interfirm technology partnering is much lower. Core technologies only account for 
about half of all partnerships between Triad and NIE companies, while two thirds of 
all partnerships involving LDCs are in areas other than core technologies. This pattern 
supports the view that the focus of technological cooperation is related to factor 
endowments of partners. Hence, DCs appear to be best prepared to participate 
successfully in globalization and attract appropriate technologies, if they specialize 
according to their comparative advantages. 
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Table 5 —  The Share of Core Technologies in International Interfirm Technology Partnering, 
1980-1989 (percent) 
  Share of core technologiesa in: 
  Strategic technological alliances  Technology transfer agreements 
Developed countries  73.0  60.9 
Triad 73.5  61.4 
Triad-NIEs 53.6  52.4 
Triad-LDCs 23.4  38.5 
aInformation technology, biotechnology, new materials. 
Source:  Freeman, Hagedoorn (1994). 
 
FDI Concentration 
The participation of DCs in the increasing division of labor would be severely 
restricted if FDI flows, which constitute a major channel of international technology 
transfers, were concentrated on a few advanced DC hosts. If, for whatever reason, such 
a pattern of FDI flows to DCs does not change over time, the majority of DCs would 
probably receive less capital and technology than would be necessary to benefit from 
the globalization of production and markets. As a consequence, these DCs could be 
caught in a poverty trap: Globalization would only support some advanced DCs that 
have a command of the relevant technologies, but would not induce economic 
development in less advanced DCs. However, the assumption of a more or less 
constant pattern of FDI flows to selected DCs is not compatible with changes in the 
regional distribution of FDI flows since 1980 (Figure 1):  
Figure 1-  Regional Distribution of FDI Flows to DCs,a 1980-1995 














Not specified (NS) East Europe and Central
Asia (EE)
       
 
a Percentage share in FDI flows to DCs except Middle East and North Africa; this region is excluded because of negative (net) FDI flows in 1980. Data on Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Taiwan are not reported. Figures for 1995 are preliminary, and were estimated for East Europe and Central Asia. 
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⎯ East Asia's share in world FDI flows has nearly quadrupled since 1980. This 
region did not maintain close institutionalized ties with either the EU or NAFTA. 
Moreover, increasing FDI among Asian DCs can only partly explain the rising 
share of East Asia in world FDI flows.
6 Hence, the dramatic shift of FDI to this 
region has to be attributed to globalization effects to a significant extent. 
⎯ The rise in East Asia's FDI share is largely due to China's emergence on world 
capital markets. FDI in China soared from virtually zero in 1980 to US$ 33.8 
billion in 1994 (World Bank, var. iss.). Asian NIEs benefited from Chinese 
liberalization and have become major investors in this country (UNCTAD 1995a). 
However, the rising attractiveness of China for foreign investors was not at the 
expense of other East Asian recipients. FDI flows to East Asian DCs other than 
China increased sevenfold from 1980 to 1994. 
⎯ Post-socialist countries in transition (notably those in Central Europe) represent 
the second group which increased its share in total FDI flows. This development is 
obviously related to the progress achieved in economic transformation, which 
encouraged the integration of transition economies into the international division 
of labor. 
⎯ Latin America, which traditionally was the preferred host region for FDI in the 
Third World, appears to be the main loser. However, the regional share in total 
FDI flows tends to obscure several factors relevant for assessing the position of 
Latin American economies in the context of globalization. First of all, FDI flows 
to Latin America have recovered significantly since the late 1980s. The 
preliminary figure of US$ 17.8 billion for 1994 exceeded the inflows of 1988 by a 
                                                 
6   According to Wallraf (1996), FDI flows within the group of Asian NIEs, ASEAN countries, 
China and Viet Nam increased by US$ 19.8 billion in 1989-1993. UNCTAD data (1995c) 
reveal that total FDI inflows to these countries increased by US$ 32.7 billion during the same 
period.   16
factor of 2.2 (World Bank, var. iss.). Furthermore, several countries in this region 
(including Argentina, Chile, and Mexico) belonged to the best performers when 
average annual FDI inflows in 1993-1994 are compared with 1983-1988.
7 
Particularly the favorable position of Argentina and Mexico indicates that 
attractiveness for FDI may be regained in the aftermath of major economic crises, 
once consistent domestic policy reforms comprising macroeconomic stabilization 
and structural adjustment are implemented.
8 The counterfactual is provided by 
Brazil, which was less reform-minded until recently. Brazil lost its top position 
with regard to FDI inflows ; FDI flows to Brazil in 1993 were only half the 
average figure for 1983-1988, and recovered only in 1994 (UNCTAD 1995c, 
Annex Table 1). 
The evidence on FDI in DCs is difficult to reconcile with the widespread belief that 
only few DCs may benefit from globalization. Underlying this belief is the 
observation that between two thirds and three quarters of total FDI flows to DCs have 
persistently been absorbed by the ten largest host economies (e.g., UNCTAD 1995b). 
But the country composition of the group of best performers changes over time. The 
top ten of 1984 experienced a decline in their share in total FDI flows to DCs until 
1994. This decline was rather modest (from 77 percent in 1984 to 73 percent in 
1994), since China, which belonged to the largest hosts in 1984 already, experienced 
a steep increase in its share (from 15 to 42 percent); excluding China, the share of the 
remaining nine top performers of 1984 was cut half to 31 percent in 1994 (World 
Bank, var. iss.).
9 
                                                 
7   FDI flows to Mexico more than doubled, while FDI flows to Chile and Argentina rose by 
factors of 3.9 and 7.3 (UNCTAD 1995c, Annex Table 1).  
8  The peso-crisis of Mexico in December 1994 revealed, however, that remaining economic and 
political risks had been underestimated.  
9   The share of the 25 best performers of 1984 in total FDI flows to all DCs declined from 92 to 
78 percent if China is included, and from 77 to 36 percent if China is excluded.   17
More importantly though, the notion of highly concentrated FDI flows to a few DCs 
is mistaken since the chances of newcomers to enhance their locational attractiveness 
for foreign investors are determined by per capita FDI inflows. The frequently noted 
concentration is mainly because of a large country bias. In per capita terms, various 
small DCs proved more attractive for FDI than larger countries. FDI patterns in Latin 
America provide a case in point (Nunnenkamp 1996). Within a sample of 18 Latin 
American host countries, the three smallest economies (in terms of population in 
1992) were indeed among the best performers in attracting foreign investors. For 
instance, per capita FDI inflows of Trinidad and Tobago in 1990-1994 (US$ 216) 
were more than twice the figure for Argentina. In the same period, Costa Rica 
received higher per capita inflows (US$ 60) than Mexico (US$ 54), and Jamaica 
came very close to Mexico's per capita inflows. 
Finally, the chances of newcomers to participate in globalization have further 
improved because some relatively advanced DCs became involved in outward FDI. 
The contribution of DCs to worldwide FDI outflows is still fairly low. But their share 
increased from an average of 5.8 percent in 1983-1988 to 14.8 percent in 1994 
(UNCTAD 1995c, Annex Table 2). DC investors are playing a significant role in 
specific recipient countries. This applies especially to the Asian region, where NIEs 
have emerged as major foreign investors in ASEAN countries and China (UNCTAD 
1995a; Riedel 1991). Taken all this evidence together, there is no empirical support 
for the claim that FDI flows are persistently concentrated on a small group of 
advanced DCs. 
III. Policy Restrictions for DCs in the Era of Globalization 
The previous sections demonstrated that exogenous factors cannot account for the 
different degree to which various DCs are participating in the globalization of 
production and markets. Neither the recent move towards regional integration, nor the   18
presumed delinking of many DCs from technology and FDI flows can explain why 
some DCs are catching up and why others are falling behind. This finding puts into 
perspective those DC economic policies that shape the international competitiveness 
of immobile factors of production. If they want to participate in globalization, DCs 
have to acknowledge that they are no longer free to pursue economic policies of their 
own liking. As it seems, there are no promising policy alternatives to striving for 
macroeconomic stability, encouraging investment in physical and human capital, and 
ensuring openness with regard to international trade and capital flows. 
Macroeconomic Stability and Factor Accumulation 
Macroeconomic stability, namely the absence of high and volatile rates of inflation, is 
the first indicator of a sound business environment. High rates of inflation render it 
difficult for consumers and producers to identify relative price changes. The reduced 
informational content of observed price changes results in higher investment risks, 
and in a misallocation of resources. Inflation safe, though less productive investments 
will be preferred. Although unexpected inflation may have a positive output effect in 
the short run by reducing real wages, money illusion is unlikely to prevail for long. 
Future wage demands will take into account the expected rate of inflation. Eventually, 
this process may end up in hyperinflation, output decline, soaring unemployment, and 
political instability. Among DCs, Latin America performed most unfavorably in this 
respect until recently, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa.
10 
Persistent inflation is generally home-made, since budget deficits of the government 
are its main reason. This is most obvious when deficits are financed by printing 
money. Alternatively, the higher the budget deficit, the higher have to be the taxes 
that producers and consumers have to pay. High business taxes impair the incentive 
to invest and, thereby, reduce productivity growth; high income taxes impair the 
                                                 
10   For details, see Gundlach, Nunnenkamp (1996, Figure 7).   19
incentive to work (except for work in the underground economy) and, thereby, 
further enforce the pressure to increase taxes. It follows that countries with large 
budget deficits and high rates of inflation are relatively unattractive locations for 
international investors, and cannot be expected to experience strong economic growth 
in the long run.  
Macroeconomic stability appears to be a necessary precondition for participating in 
globalization. In a stable macroeconomic environment, investment can be expected to 
be higher because risks are reduced. More investment enlarges the stock of capital per 
worker, increases labor productivity, and produces higher incomes in the long run. 
With regard to physical capital accumulation, low-inflation East Asia displayed an 
outstanding performance among DCs.
11 Yet, the case of Central Europe indicates that 
high rates of investment do not guarantee successful economic development. In this 
region, centrally planned investment resulted in allocative distortions so that 
productivity growth remained sluggish until the regime shift. Moreover, physical 
capital accumulation is not all that matters. Human capital accumulation may be even 
more important as a driving force of economic growth. This is all the more so in the 
global economy, given that the diffusion of new technologies is advanced by 
declining information and transaction costs, and the application of such technologies 
depends on the availability of complementary local skills. Taking average years of 
schooling as proxy of the stock of human capital, this consideration is supported at 
least partly: Among DCs, East Asia is again the best performing region (Gundlach, 
Nunnenkamp 1996).  
More systematic evidence for the hypothesis that factor accumulation in the form of 
investment in physical and human capital plays a leading role for an explanation of 
                                                 
11  It should be noted that high investment rates usually reflect high domestic savings. This is so 
because the difference between investment and domestic savings equals the current account 
deficit, which rarely exceeds 5 percent of GDP over longer time periods.   20
economic success comes from empirical cross-country studies (Barro 1991; Mankiw 
et al. 1992; Gundlach 1995). These studies uniformly confirm that human capital 
formation is at least as important as physical capital formation for explaining the 
large differences in per capita income between industrialized countries and DCs. 
They also support theoretical models which predict that economic backwardness is 
not necessarily a permanent state of affairs. Low income countries have the chance to 
realize higher growth rates than rich countries, mainly because they can use existing 
technologies rather than having to invent them. Therefore, controlling for different 
rates of factor accumulation, one would expect a convergence of per capita income 
between poor and rich countries in the long run. But previous empirical studies 
concluded that the speed of convergence is fairly low, namely in the range of 
2 percent per year or even less. Hence this "natural" catching-up process alone does 
not suffice to realize substantial improvements in the standard of living within 
reasonable periods of time. The East Asian example reveals, however, that there are 
ways to speed up convergence. Integration into the international division of labor 
appears to be crucially important in this respect. 
Openness and Factor Accumulation 
Openness in the form of largely unrestricted international trade and capital flows is of 
utmost importance for DCs to ease the necessary technology import, either through 
the import of investment goods or through FDI inflows and other forms of 
international investment cooperation. Openness promotes domestic competition and 
efficiency, and supports a closer integration into the world economy by shaping the 
production structure according to the respective comparative advantages of the 
economy. At the same time, a closer world market integration implies fewer degrees 
of freedom for domestic economic policies, unless one is prepared to run the danger 
of being delinked from world capital markets. Arguably, East Asian DCs successfully 
attracted FDI and became the economic powerhouse of the world economy just   21
because economic policies responded in a more appropriate way than in other DC 
regions to the adjustment needs resulting from progressing worldwide economic 
integration.  
Openness is likely to be more important for DCs than for industrialized countries. To 
see why this is so, consider a neoclassical growth model for the open economy. Barro 
et al. (1995) show that an open economy described by the production function 
() YK H A L tt t t t =
−− α β αβ 1  , 01 <+< α β , 
where  Yt is output at time t ,  K  is the stock of physical capital, H  is the stock of 
human capital,  A is the level of technology, and L is labor, converges to its steady 
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where α  and β are the shares of physical and human capital in factor income, n is 
the rate of labor force growth, g is the rate of technological progress, and δ  is the 
depreciation rate of human and physical capital. 
The central assumption of this model is that physical capital is internationally mobile, 
but human capital is not. By contrast, the convergence rate for the closed economy 
with internationally immobile physical and human capital is given by (Mankiw et al. 
1992)  
() () λ α β δ closed ng =−− + + 1  . 
The standard parameterization for the rate of technological progress is 2 percent and 
for the depreciation rate 5 percent (Barro et al. 1995). For industrialized countries, n 
was about 1 percent in 1980-1993 (World Bank 1995). The share of physical capital 
in factor income is about 30 percent for industrialized countries (Maddison 1987),   22
and the share of human capital in factor income is about 50 percent.
12 That is, for 
industrialized countries (IC), the two rates of convergence to the steady state are 











(0.01+0.02+0.05) = 0.023, and 
λclosed
IC  = (1-0.3-0.5) (0.01+0.02+0.05) = 0.016. 
The story is different for DCs. Labor force growth in DCs was about 2 percent in 
1980-1993 (World Bank 1995). Moreover, the share of physical capital in factor 
income is much larger in DCs than 30 percent as in industrialized countries. For a 
sample of DCs that report detailed National Accounts Statistics to the UN, this share 
is about 60 percent on average, and the average share of human capital in factor 
income is about 20 percent (Gundlach 1996). If so, openness seems to matter much 
more for DCs than for industrialized countries. The convergence rate for an open 











(0.02 +0.02+0.05) = 0.045,  
and the convergence rate for a closed economy is 
λclosed
DC  = (1 - 0.6 - 0.2) (0.02 + 0.02 + 0.05) = 0.018. 
                                                 
12  The calculation of the share of human capital in factor income is somewhat tricky, because 
there is no National Accounts counterpart. One way to derive an estimate for the share of 
human capital in the total wage bill is to focus on the rate of return to education and average 
years of schooling, thereby assuming that investment in education is the same thing as an 
increase in the stock of human capital. For example, with a social rate of return to secondary 
education of about 13 percent and average school attendance of about 8 years, both figures 
representing worldwide averages (Psacharopoulos 1993), it follows that investment in 
education raises income by a factor of three (e0.08⋅13 ≈ 3). Hence, income is predicted to be three 
times higher with human capital than without. Accordingly, the share of human capital in the 
total wage bill should be about two thirds. Multiplying this figure with the share of labor in 
factor income gives an overall share of human capital in income of about 50 percent.   23
This difference is large. With a predicted convergence rate of 4.5 percent for the open 
economy, halfway to steady state is reached in about 16 years; with a predicted 
convergence rate of 1.8 percent for the closed economy, halfway to steady state is 
reached in about 39 years. Hence, the open economy DC is predicted to reach 
halfway to steady state almost one generation earlier than the closed economy. 
If the model is correct, more open DCs should have experienced a better growth 
performance, i.e., a higher rate of convergence to the steady state. Whether a country 
is open or not can be measured by the degree of international capital mobility, as was 
first suggested by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). Montiel (1994) uses the Feldstein-
Horioka approach in a time series context and finds a surprisingly high degree of 
capital mobility in his sample of DCs, although a large number of inconclusive cases 
remains. We select only those DCs from his sample which can be identified either as 
closed or open. Moreover, to control for data quality, we exclude DCs which do not 
report detailed National Accounts Statistics. Our resulting final sample consists of 13 
open and nine closed DCs.
13 We use this sample to calculate the rates of convergence 
for open and closed DCs. 
Mankiw et al. (1982) show that based on the previously mentioned production 
function, the rate of convergence (λ) can be estimated by regressing the log 
difference of income per worker at time t  and some initial date 0 on the determinants 
of the steady state and the initial level of income. Augmenting such an equation by a 
slope and an intercept dummy for openness, we get 
 
                                                 
13  According to the findings of Montiel (1995) for 1970-1990, Benin, Cameroon, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Sierra Leone 
and Uruguay can be classified as open, while Honduras, Kenya, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, 
the Philippines, Venezuela and Zimbabwe can be classified as closed.   24
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where  ∆KY /  is the share of physical capital investment in output, and ∆HY /  is the 
share of human capital investment in output.
14 OPEN is an intercept dummy, which 
equals 1 for open DCs and 0 otherwise; SLOPEN is a slope dummy, which equals 
initial income for open DCs and 0 otherwise. All other variables and parameters are 
defined as before. 
With only 22 observations at hand, a regression based on this convergence equation 
would result in a serious degrees of freedom problem. Therefore, we restrict the 
convergence equation according to the empirical results in Mankiw et al. (1992, Tab. 
VI, intermediate sample) as 
() () () ( ) [] ( ) () [ ] l n / l n / .l n/ l n .l n/ l n YL YL KY ng H Y ng t −− − + + − − + + 0 0 506 0 266 ∆∆ δδ  
() () =− − + − − CONSTANT e Y L OPEN SLOPEN t 1 0
λ γ ln / . 
That is, our regression equation uses the conditional growth rate as the new 
dependent variable. Thereby, we control for differences among DCs in the two rates 
of factor accumulation and in the rate of labor force growth, which together 
determine the steady state. Using this approach, we estimate the following regression 
coefficients and the implied rates of convergence (standard errors in parentheses): 
 
                                                 
14  The share of human capital investment in output is measured as the percentage of the working 
age population in secondary schools, which is taken from Mankiw et al. (1992). All other 
variables are taken from Summers and Heston (1991). Time t is 1985, time 0 is 1960. For 
details, see Gundlach (1996).   25
Conditional growth rate = 2.53 + 3.62  OPEN –0.31  ( ) ln / YL 0 –  0.41 SLOPEN 
  (0.73) (1.09)    (0.09)   (0.13) 
Number of observations:   22 
R2 = 0.76               s.s.e. = 0.22 
Implied λopen
DC  :  0.051 
 (0.013) 
Implied λclosed
DC  : 0.015         . 
 (0.006) 
Our empirical findings for the two rates of convergence roughly confirm the 
difference between open and closed economies predicted by the neoclassical model of 
economic growth, assuming that the share of physical capital in factor income is 
about 60 percent and the share of human capital is about 20 percent in DCs. Open 
DCs converge at a much higher rate to their steady state than closed DCs. Put 
differently, openness shortens considerably the time period until the steady state is 
reached, although it does not change the steady state itself. Taking the point estimates 
of the two convergence rates literally, the open economy would reach halfway to 
steady state about 33 years earlier than the closed economy. It follows that openness 
along with factor accumulation matters for economic growth, especially in DCs. 
IV. Summary 
Our findings support the notion that globalization offers better chances for DCs to 
catch up economically with industrialized countries. Globalization is likely to ease 
the inflow of capital and technology, thus helping to increase the rate of factor 
accumulation beyond the level to be financed by domestic savings. But globalization 
also reduces the degrees of freedom of economic policy making in DCs. First of all, it 
requires openness on behalf of DCs. In addition, DCs characterized by pronounced 
macroeconomic instability are unlikely to achieve a high rate of domestic (physical   26
and human) capital accumulation, which is a precondition for economic success. 
Capital formation has largely to be financed by domestic savings. Hence, capital 
formation is impaired by high government deficits, which represent negative savings 
and are the main source of macroeconomic instability. It will definitely prove 
difficult for many DCs to pursue economic policies that successfully combine macro-
economic stabilization, a high rate of domestic savings, and a liberalization of 
external trade and capital flows. Yet there is no promising alternative in the era of 
globalization. Exogenous factors such as refused membership in major regional 
integration schemes and the lack of preferential trade agreements with such schemes, 
as well as the supposed concentration of FDI and international technology transfers 
on just a few DCs  cannot be blamed for the failure of many DCs in the past to 
participate successfully in the international division of labor. Principal responsibility 
rests with DCs themselves.   27
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